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Legislative Ethics and Codes of Conduct
Riccardo Pelizzo and Rick Stapenhurst
Introduction
In the course of the past two decades, both the international community and the
scholarly community paid increasing attention to the causes and the conse-
quences of corruption.1 As chapter 2 has shown, corruption is often a symptom
of a deeper institutional weakness, and to reduce corruption, it is necessary to
eliminate the conditions that favor the existence of corrupt practices and other
forms of misconduct.
The establishment of ethics regimes, by adopting either ethics codes or codes
of conduct, represents a valuable anti-corruption tool. In fact, by creating ethics
regimes, parliaments (a) establish a standard for parliamentarians’ behavior, (b) clar-
ify what forms of behavior are acceptable and what forms are improper, (c) create an
environment that is less likely to tolerate misconduct and other forms of unethical
behavior, and, by doing so, (d) create an environment in which parliamentarians are
less likely to engage in corrupt practices. 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss how some parliaments have attempted
to create ethics regimes and to show how such regimes may be used to promote
good governance and, by doing so, to create a system of disincentives for corrupt
practices. 
This chapter is organized in the following way. The first section provides a fairly
detailed discussion of the ethics regimes and of how ethics regimes can contribute
to fighting corruption and other forms of misconduct. Particular attention is paid to
the fact that ethics regimes can be established by adopting codes of conduct, codes
of ethics, or ethics rules. It discusses what are the most important differences
between these institutional tools. Building on this discussion, the second section
shows that while codes of conduct are generally more specific than ethics codes,
they vary with regard to how specific are their provisions. The third section argues
that the effectiveness of codes of conduct is affected by a variety of factors, such as
the existence and severity of sanctions; the institutionalization of the code (which
refers to which institution is in charge of administering those sanctions); cultural
factors (attitudes, values, and norms); and the training of parliamentarians. The
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fourth section draws some conclusions and formulates suggestions as to what the
international community could do to contribute to the establishment of successful
ethics regimes and, by doing so, to eliminating corruption. 
The Need for an Effective Ethics Regime
In a democratic system, each citizen has the right to exercise as much influence on
the political process as any other citizen. In fact, in democratic regimes, each citizen
has the right to cast his or her vote at the elections and to influence, through the
vote, the composition of the legislature and the selection of the government. 
Yet, as soon as corruption emerges, two problems appear. The first is that those
citizens who have more financial means at their disposal and use these to corrupt
elected officials acquire additional influence over the political process. This is a vio-
lation of the spirit of democracy: that citizens should exercise equal power on the
political process. 
However, corruption creates a second, and not less menacing, problem for
democracy because corrupt politicians could utilize illicitly obtained resources for
their electoral campaigns, thus acquiring an advantage over the other candidates
and improving their chances of being elected. By so doing, corrupt candidates dis-
tort electoral competition and prevent the people’s will from being properly
expressed; this poses a direct threat to democracy.2
However, corruption is not the only threat to democracy. Any form of legisla-
tive misconduct undermines the public trust in the democratic system, and by
doing so, it poses an indirect threat to the democratic system. As Seymour Martin
Lipset pointed out more than four decades ago, the single most important condi-
tion for making democracy survive is that democratic system’s legitimacy (Lipset
1959, 69–108). 
Surveys around the world show that legislatures around the world are facing a
“democratic deficit”—that there are low, and generally declining, levels of public
trust in legislatures. As figure 13.1 indicates, the legislature ranks as the least pub-
licly trusted institution in certain Latin American countries, although in others it
ranks much more favorably. 
Similarly, public opinion polls around the world consistently rate public trust in
politicians as low. 
The creation of an ethics regime represents an attempt to regulate the behavior
of legislators and to rebuild the public trust in the political system. The question is:
can this work? And, if so, how can an ethics regime be established? What are the
basic elements of an ethics regime? 
Creating an Ethics Regime
To develop citizens’ trust in the political system, legislators, understand the need
for ethics reforms. The adoption of an ethics regime is intended to serve both an
internal and external function. Internally, the enforcement of an ethics regime is
intended to improve the ethical standards and performance of elected officials.
Externally, it is intended to regain the confidence of the public.
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2 A discussion of corruption and misconduct can be found in Skelcher and Snape (2001, 72–78).
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Codes of Ethics and Codes of Conduct
Ethics regimes are created by adopting codes of ethics, codes of conduct, ethics
rules, or all of the above. But what is a code of conduct? What is a code of ethics?
How do they differ from each other? 
Codes of ethics “are usually products of professional associations. They serve as
a quality assurance statement to society and provide a set of standards for appro-
priate conduct for members of the profession that issues the code. Codes of ethics
for those in government service challenge employees to identify with shared pro-
fessional values that describe appropriate actions about acting rightly in the service
of the public good” (Bruce 1996, 23). 
Codes of conduct are quite different. They “. . . are more concrete and practical
. . . for they represent executive orders or legislatively defined and enforceable
behavioral standards with sanction for violation. They contain a list of the kinds of
behavior required in a given set of circumstances and provide direction to those
whose conduct they govern. Codes of conduct contain minimalistic prohibitions
to unquestionably subversive or criminal acts. They are designed to protect the
government employee, the client, and/or the public at large” (Bruce 1996, 24). In
sum, there is a major difference between codes of conduct and codes of ethics.
Legislative Codes of Conduct
As was previously noted, codes of conduct represent one way in which parliaments
and parliamentarians have attempted to establish effective ethics regimes. A formal
code of conduct has been adopted by the legislatures of Chile, Fiji, Germany,
Grenada, Israel, Japan, the Philippines, Poland, the United Kingdom, and the United
States of America, while the Indian Lok Sabha has a customary code of conduct.3
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Figure 13.1 Parliaments: Misgoverned or Honest Institutions?
Sources: WBI diagnostics and survey data, various countries, 1998–2006.
3 On this point, see the dataset of the Inter-Parliamentary Union. This dataset can be found at
www.ipu.org. The Chilean Code of Conduct can be found on the Web site of the Chilean
Congress: www.camara.cl/aindex/browsers/codigo_conducta.pdf.
A legislative code of conduct is a formal document that regulates the behavior
of legislators by establishing what is considered to be an acceptable behavior and
what is not. In other words, it is intended to promote a political culture that places
considerable emphasis on the propriety, correctness, transparency, and honesty of
parliamentarians’ behavior. However, the code of conduct is not intended to cre-
ate this behavior by itself. As Skelcher and Snape (2001, 73–74) pointed out, “com-
pliance with codes of conduct . . . encourages a decision-making environment in
which fraud and corruption should be less prevalent. But they cannot stop such
offences.”
How Specific Are the Provisions of a Code of Conduct?
Even though codes of conduct are more specific than codes of ethics, there is consid-
erable variation in how specific their provisions can be. They may ask members of
the legislature to disclose their interests concerning tax returns, sources of patrimo-
nial income, investments, sources of income of the business of a partner or share-
holder, ownership interest in a business, real estate interests, offices or directorships,
creditor indebtedness, leases and other contacts with public entities, compensated
representation before public entities, fees and honoraria, professional or occupa-
tional licenses, reimbursement of travel expenses from private sources, deposits in
financial institutions, cash surrender value of insurance, private employer or nature
of private employment, professional services rendered, identification of trusts by
trustee, identification of trusts by beneficiary, names of immediate family members,
and financial interests of spouse and children (NDI 1999, 5). The disclosure of inter-
ests before debating an issue related to those interests is a relatively common protec-
tion against conflicts of interest.4
In addition to asking legislators to disclose their interests, codes of conduct may
impose some additional restrictions. Some apply while the legislator is in office,
and some of them apply even after the legislator’s tenure in office. The list of
restricted activities include the following items: use of public position to obtain per-
sonal benefit, providing benefits to influence official actions, use of confidential
government information, postgovernmental employment for two years, receipt of
gifts by officials or employees above a certain value, receipt of fees or honoraria by
public officials or employees, representation of private clients by public officials or
employees, financial conflicts of interest, nepotism, political activity by employees,
competitive bidding, outside employment or business activities by public officials
or employees, and travel payments from nongovernment services.
Are There Complementary Factors That Can Contribute to the
Effectiveness of Codes of Conduct?
Several factors may contribute to the effectiveness of legislative codes of conduct,
including the existence of sanctions, institutionalization, cultural attitudes, and
training. Each of these will be considered in turn. 
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4 A discussion of the conflicts of interest can be found in Zimmerman (1994, 17–46).
Sanctions
There is some variation in the severity of the sanctions established for the violation
of a code of conduct. Violations of the code of conduct can be punished with vari-
ous sanctions such as censure, reprimand, fines, loss of seniority, and expulsion.
(The data are presented in table 13.1.)
There is some variation in the severity of the sanctions established for a viola-
tion of the code. In Fiji, for example, the violation may be punished by the loss of
mandate; in most other countries, there is a gradation of sanctions, ranging from
reprimand and fine up to loss of mandate and (in the case of the Philippines)
imprisonment.
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Table 13.1 Codes of Conduct and Sanctions
Country Sanction Sanctions administered by
Fiji Loss of mandate n.a.
Grenada Warning, reprimand, order House of Representatives
to withdraw, suspension 
Loss of mandate High Court
India Reprimand or admonition, House of the People
imprisonment, suspension, 
expulsion
Disqualification from membership Speaker of the House
on grounds of defection
Israel Remark, warning, rebuke, The Knesset Ethics 
severe rebuke Committee
Suspension from office The Knesset Ethics 
Committee
Loss of mandate The Knesset
Japan Admonition to abide by the Deliberative Council 
standards of conduct, on Political Ethics
admonition to refrain from 
presenting at the House for a 
certain period of time, 
admonition to resign from the 
chairmanship of a committee
Philippines Imprisonment, disqualification n.a.
to hold public office
United Kingdom Committal, reprimand or House of Commons
admonition, suspension from 
the House, expulsion
United States of America Censure, reprimand, fines, loss House of Representatives
of seniority, expulsion
Source: Bruce 1996.
Sanctions are generally administered by one of the following bodies: independ-
ent commission, parliamentary ethics committee, parliament, speaker of the parlia-
ment, or court.5
Are sanctions effective? The question has two levels of answers. The first con-
cerns whether sanctions are effective in eliminating misconduct while the second is
whether sanctions affect the citizens’ perception of the morality of legislators.
Although there is no evidence as to whether sanctions are able to curb corrup-
tion and other forms of misconduct, there is some evidence on whether (and how
much) sanctions affect public officials’ perceived morality. The evidence was gath-
ered by a survey conducted by Willa Bruce in 1993 shows that “a clearly worded
code of ethics with sanction” is the best way to curb corruption in government; at
the same time, however, the survey also found that citizens’ perception was influ-
enced by the existence of a code of conduct rather than the presence or severity of
sanctions (Bruce 1996, 27).
Institutionalization
A further difference can be observed between the various codes of conduct con-
cerning the institutionalization of the code (that is, which institution is in charge of
sanctioning those members who violate the code). In general, there are two princi-
pal variations: an independent commission (as in the case, for example, in Alberta,
New South Wales, and Ontario) and an internal parliamentary body (either a par-
liamentary committee, as in Japan, or a parliamentary commissioner, as in the
United Kingdom [see annex at end of this chapter, “Case Study of the House of
Commons”]). In the case of extreme sanctions, cases may be referred to the High
Court (as in Grenada) or to the Speaker of the House (as in India).
Attitudes, Culture, and Successful Codes of Conduct 
In the political science literature, several phenomena are explained based on politi-
cal culture, which is commonly defined as “the values and attitudes shared by a
group.” The literature on parliamentary ethics is no exception in this respect: it also
emphasizes the role of political culture.
The analysis of the role of political culture with regard to parliamentary ethics
must be twofold. First, it is necessary to study whether the existence of a specific
political culture is conducive to the enactment of ethics reforms; second, it should
be questioned whether the existence of a specific political culture affects whether,
and to what extent, ethics reforms are successful.
A study conducted by Marshall R. Goodman, Timothy J. Holp, and Karen M.
Ludwig (1996, 51–57) revealed that there is no detectable relationship between
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5 A discussion of some of the institutions that can administer sanctions can be found in Dr.
Andrew Brien (consultant) (1998–99), “A Code of Conduct for Parliamentarians?” Research
Paper 2, Department of the Parliamentary Library, Parliament of Australia. In addition to the
solutions identified in this Research Paper, the data presented in table 13.1 suggest two addi-
tional options. One is that extremely severe sanctions, such as the loss of mandate, are
decided by a high court (as in the case of Grenada). The other is that sanctions may be
imposed by the speaker of the house (as in the Indian case). 
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political culture and whether ethics reforms are enacted. Attempts to create ethics
regimes are generally a response to other forces, such as media investigations, scan-
dals, and falling levels of public trust.
On the other hand, scholars have underlined that cultural factors, such as the
existence of a common political culture, are a necessary condition for the success of
ethics reforms. As Skelcher and Snape (2001, 74) pointed out, the success of an
ethics regime requires the existence of a homogenous political culture. A code of
conduct functions properly under three (cultural) conditions: (a) when the individ-
uals, whom the code is intended to regulate, share the same attitudes and values;6
(b) when those individuals have a shared view of what are the problems that the
code is supposed to eliminate; and (c) if the individuals have a shared view of how
those problems can be eliminated.
Yet, this is not always the case. A recent study of the ethical standards of the
British MPs has revealed not only that is there no common set of values and atti-
tudes but also that there are quite different views among MPs concerning ethical
standards. According to Mancuso (1993), “there is a multiplicity of ethical stan-
dards operative in the House [of Commons]. The conventional view that a common
standard guides the behavior of MPs is simply incorrect.” British MPs condemned
corruption and criminal behavior. They also “condemned activities such as bribery,
blatant misappropriation of public funds, and other clear statutory violations,” but
Mancuso went on to say, “in the problematic grey areas of constituency service and
conflict of interest, the ethical consensus begins to unravel. . . . [Indeed,] on many
important issues, there is stark dissensus among MPs as to what constitutes accept-
able behavior, and many are engaging in activities that other[s] find reprehensible.” 
Mancuso pushed her analysis a step further. By investigating MPs’ tolerance for
conflicts of interest and constituency service and the relationship between the two
types of tolerance, she was able to identify four distinct ethical types, which she
defines as “puritans, servants, muddlers, and entrepreneurs.” Puritans have little
tolerance for both conflicts of interest and constituency service; servants tolerate
constituency service, but not conflicts of interest; muddlers tolerate conflicts of
interest, but not constituency service; and entrepreneurs will tolerate any kind of
activity that is not explicitly forbidden.
The fact that there are quite different views regarding ethical standards among
legislators has important implications, and it is something that reformers should
take into consideration before enacting ethics reforms. If there is no consensus
among MPs about what constitutes improper behavior, about the nature of the
ethics problems, and about what changes should be made to make the ethics regime
work, then any ethics reform is likely to face substantial problems. In other words,
to make ethics reforms work, it is of prime importance to promote a common set of
civic attitudes and ethical values among MPs. 
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6 This means that for the proper functioning of a code of conduct adopted in a given parlia-
ment, the members of that parliament must have a set of shared values and attitudes. The
fact that legislators in another country’s parliament have a different set of values is
absolutely not relevant, provided that if a code of conduct were adopted in this second par-
liament, its members should share a common set of attitudes and values. In other words,
what is relevant for the success of a conduct code is cultural homogeneity within countries,
not between countries.
Training
The training of legislators represents one way in which a common set of civic atti-
tudes and values can be promoted. Such training—by clarifying what is miscon-
duct; presenting findings of studies concerning the roots of misconduct; showing
that misconduct undermines the legitimacy of democratic regimes (and indeed
may threaten their survival, at least in newly established democracies); raising the
awareness of the importance of eliminating misconduct; and identifying ways in
which misconduct can be eliminated—can play a crucial role in making ethics
reforms and ethics regimes succeed.
Conclusions and Recommendations
Ethics reforms and the establishment of ethics regimes serve two purposes. Ethical
regimes are typically created with the intention of preventing corruption and mis-
conduct. They do so by creating incentives for parliamentarians and legislators to
perform their functions in an ethical manner. This is what we have called the “inter-
nal function.” Ethics regimes and ethics reforms also serve an “external function”:
they can help reconstruct public confidence in elected officials and parliamentary
institutions.
There are some steps that parliamentarians and legislators can take to avoid
dilemmas in their conduct:
• First, parliamentarians can propose and promote the adoption of clearly
worded codes of conduct. In doing so, parliamentarians must keep in mind
that the successful establishment of an ethics regime depends to a large
extent on the clarity of a code’s dispositions. The code should specify what
forms of behavior are acceptable, what forms of behavior are not acceptable,
and what sanctions will be adopted to punish violations of the code. 
• Second, it is of importance that the dispositions of the conduct code are rea-
sonable and set a standard of behavior that parliamentarians can actually
respect. If the dispositions of the code are unrealistic, they cannot be
enforced, and the adoption of the code will at best be useless and at worst
further undermine public confidence in politicians.
• Third, parliamentarians can propose and promote the adoption of specific
parliamentary committees called “ethics committees.” Such committees can
perform two functions: to clarify the meaning of the code’s dispositions and
to ensure that the code dispositions are enforced consistently and impar-
tially. This point has an obvious corollary: that ethics committees should not
be used in a partisan way to get rid of political opponents and to promote
the interests of a particular party. Doing so will ultimately lead to the failure
of the newly established ethics regime. 
• Fourth, parliamentarians should refrain from engaging in any activity that
may damage their personal reputation and the reputation of the parliament.
Genuine commitment to preserving the parliament’s reputation is the most
important condition for making ethics reforms succeed. 
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